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IV
To recapitulate:
1)

The right of privacy exists as a complex of four distinct torts;

2) Privacy actions have been used with or as alternatives to defamation actions; and
3) The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press
apply equally to defamation and "false light" privacy actions, both requiring knowing or reckless falsity on the part of the defendant.
The next logical step, perhaps taken invisibly by the instant case, is
the absorption of defamation by the right of privacy. Griswold5 4 seems
to indicate that the most likely course for the Court to take is the balancing of one constitutional right against another-freedom of speech
and press against the equally fundamental right of privacy. Balancing at
this point seems to favor the former. In the instant case, six of the nine
justices favor a strong or absolute priority of claims for freedom of the
press over the competing claims of privacy. It thus seems safe to say
that the Court is not going to move far from its present position in the
foreseeable future. This one aspect of the right of privacy may swallow
defamation in due course, but the tests of defamation seem destined in
55
turn to swallow this segment of the right.
V
There is a grim irony in this story of a man who wanted the right
"to be let alone." To assert that right, he has stood in the judicial spotlight for eleven years, through a trial and five appeals,56 only to find
himself thrown back for further proceedings. Should he prevail, his vindication of his right of privacy, which affects us all, must seem a Pyrrhic
victory. In any event, the right of privacy as heretofore conceived seems
much narrower.
WILLIAM J. CARL.

WATER

LAW:

RECOGNITION

OF

A

PUBLIC

WATER

RIGHT.-Respondent

DePuy mandamused the Fish and Game Commission to relicense his artificial fish ponds.1 The appellant then instituted an action for a mandatory injunction to compel the respondent to build a fishladder on his
"1Supra note 21.
'-In a manner reminiscent of the Gingham Dog and the Calico Cat.
'155 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1956); 207 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1960); 216 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1961); 240
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963); 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965); and instant case.
CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 26-306 (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.) provides for the licensing of artificial lakes and ponds. The
ponds in question had been licensed before and although there had been some slight

'REVISED

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1966

1

Montana Law
Review, Vol.LAW
28 [1966],
Iss. 2, Art. 7
MONTANA
REVIEW

[Vol. 28

diversion dam. 2 The trial court held for respondent on both issues, finding that the Commission's denied of the license had been arbitrary, and that
there was no evidence to support the Commission's argument that the diverted stream was a natural avenue for fish. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Montana, held, affirmed. Mandamus will lie to compel proper
administrative action where there has been a flagrant abuse of discretion.
The court went on to say that while a public water right for recreational
purposes was not found here, under the proper circumstances one should
be recognized. 3 Paradise Rainbows v. Fish and Game Commission, 421
P.2d 717 (Mont. 1966).
The importance of this decision lies in its implied recognition of a
public water right.4 Heretofore it was not recognized that the public
could acquire rights in water for fishing or other recreational purposes. 5
However, it appears as a necessary implication of this decision that the
public may acquire such a right in certain recreational waters by sufficient use.6 The Fish and Game Commission contended that the public
had used the creek as a natural fish hatchery and for fishing before
DePuy built his dam.7 Such use by the public was said to have created
a water right which was prior in time to that of the respondent's.8 In
response to this argument the court said :9
Such a public right has never been declared in the case law of

this state. California, an appropriation doctrine jurisdiction, whose

changes in the ponds due to highway construction the Court did not feel there was a
sufficient basis for the refusal. Instant case at 719.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 26-104(9) makes it the duty of the Fish and Game Commission "to
furnish plans for, and to direct and compel the construction and installation and
repair of fish ladders upon dams and other obstructions in streams, which, however,
shall be installed and maintained at the expense of the owners of said dam or other
obstruction. "
'The MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15 declares that every beneficial use of water shall be a
public use. The public right implied by the court here is analogous to a private
right, but it is based on use by the general public rather than an individual. For a
background in public water rights see: WATERS AND WATER RiGoTS §§ 35-39 (Clark
ed. 1967).
'The rule that a flagrant abuse of discretion may be corrected by mandamus appears
to be settled in Montana. See: State ex rel Marshall v. District Court, 50 Mont. 289,
294-95, 146 Pac. 743 (1915); Westercamp v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners,
137 Mont. 451, 458, 352 P.2d 995, 999 (1960); Skaggs Drug Centers v. Mont. Liquor
Control Board, 146 Mont. 115, 123-24, 404 P.2d 511, 516 (1965). On the other hand
the Court's recognition of the possibility of a public water right is not settled, but
the concept is one of great future importance to the State. Therefore it will be
considered exclusively.
'Instant case at 721.
6
See supra note 3.
'Instant case at 721.
'lbid. If the public had a prior right, DePuy could not use the water to the detriment
of that right. Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer, 32 Mont. 541, 554, 81 Pac. 334 (1905). However, the Court held that by his appropriation DePuy had acquired a property right
in the use of allthe water in Armstrong Spring Creek, which he had diverted by
means of a dam. It was on this dam that the Commission sought to have the fishladder erected. Such a fishladder, however, would necessitate a release of DePuy's
water over the dam. This would constitute a taking of DePuy's property and " (i)ndividuals who have put water to a beneficial use should not have their rights
arbitrarily diluted under claim of sovereign rights or otherwise."
'Instant case at 721. (emphasis added)
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Constitutional provisions relating to water rights are virtually the
same as Article III, § 15 of the Montana Constitution, has recognized
such a right and has upheld statutes requiring fishways. People v.
Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 127 Cal.App. 30, 15 P.2d 549. Under the
proper circumstances we feel that such a public interest should be
recognized. This issue will inevitably grow more pressing as increasing demands are made on our water resources. An abundance
of good trout streams is unquestionably an asset of considerable
value to the people of Montana.
While the Commission's argument is plausible, we cannot yield to it,
given the facts at hand.
The court found the facts were insufficient to establish a public
right for three reasons. First, and most important was the failure to find
sufficient use by the public. Contrary to the contentions of the Commission, the court found: "Armstrong Spring Creek is a short stream and
is obviously not a major migratory route for large numbers of fish."'1
The other reasons for the rejection of the public right were more pragmatic. The court implied that the Commission was estopped because the
dam had been built with its knowledge and yet no demand was made for
Finally, a mandatory injunction, as an
a fishladder at that time."
on the part of the
extraordinary remedy, required a stronger showing
2
Commission to move the discretion of the court.'
The court gave little indication of what facts would be sufficient to
find a public right. Further, it did not define the nature of the public
right it had denied. States which have dealt with the question have described the right in terms of "minimum flow." 13 That is, the public
acquired a right to a certain flow of water in the natural stream bed
which is not subject to further appropriation. 14 Such a definition is not
sufficient. Rather, the right must be defined broadly enough to provide
water of both sufficient quantity and quality to support fish. The mere
fact of running water in a stream bed will not necessarily maintain a
game fish habitat.' 5 The quality of the water is of equal, if not greater,
importance than quantity. For example, the amount of pollution in the
water and its temperature have a marked effect on the ability of a stream
1OIbid.
"Ibid. DePuy constructed the dam in 1957 under the inspection of several members
of the Commission. The action of injunction was brought more than seven years
later and after DePuy had brought his action for mandanmus. Still there is a
question as to whether estoppel would have been proper under these circumstances.
In the past the Court has required an element of constructive fraud as well as a duty
to speak and actual reliance. Sherlock v. Greaves, 106 Mont. 206, 217, 76 P.2d 87
(1938); Moore v. Sherman, 52 Mont. 542, 547, 159 Pac. 966 (1916) ; Fabian v.
Collins, 3 Mont. 215, 229, 231 (1878). Further it would appear that a public agency's
action should not estop the public where the right was acquired through non-agency
action.

"Ibid. "It is the law of this state that injunctions are extraordinary remedies, granted
with caution, and in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. State ex rel Blackwood
v. Lutes, 142 Mont. 29, 381 P.2d 479.''
3See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798 (Colo. 1965).

' 4Ibid. The Plaintiff there sought to appropriate a minimum flow necessary for the
preservation of fish life.
"5BIENNIAL

REPORT OF THE MONTANA FISH AND GAME CoMimssioN, May 1, 1960 - April

30, 1962, at 21.
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to support game fish.16 Agricultural silt in sufficient quantity impedes7

the flow of oxygen to the fish eggs and prevents their maturation.'
Irrigation also may increase the temperature of the water above a desirable level for game fish.18

Traditional private water rights are not so limited. In Montana and
other appropriation doctrine jurisdictions, a person who puts water to
a beneficial use acquires a right to a certain quality of water as well as
a certain quantity. 9 The beneficial use of20 water by the public should be
the basis for recognizing a parallel right.
The court, in its implicit recognition of a public right avoided two
potential problems. One is the traditional requirement of an actual diversion of the water to create a water right'.21 This was satisfactory for
typical private uses such as mining and irrigation. 22 But a diversion
would not normally be practical to appropriate water for fishing and other
recreational uses. 23 The other problem is whether game fish use is a beneficial use within the meaning of the Constitution; the court implied it
24

was.

In certain respects there appears to be little difference between a
public right and the traditional private water right. For example, to
acquire the right all that is required for both is the application of
water to a beneficial purpose.25 However, unlike a private use, where
'1Id. at 27. A test was run of Blue Water Creek to test the effect of temperature and
agricultural pollution on fish life and habitat. Samples were taken above and below a
diversion for irrigation. Above the diversion where the water was cool and clean, one
acre of stream produced over 4,000 trout and only 40 suckers. Below the ditches
that returned the warm irrigation waste water, in one acre, only 80 trout were found
while there were over 12,000 suckers, dace and minnows.
'Ibid. Without silt there was a 98% hatch while in silt there was 0% hatch.
1
81bid. In the test described supra note 16, the temperature of the water had increased
from 72 degrees to 81.
9
' Atchinson v. Peterson, 1 Mont. 561 (1872), aff'd, 87 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1874) ; Jones
v. Hanson, 133 Mont. 115, 320 P.2d 1007, 1014 (1958).
°There is no reason to deny the public the right, although ascertaining what the condition of the water was at the time of the appropriation will be more difficult than in
the case of some private rights. See: Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 222 Pac. 451
(1924).
-"See: Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., supra
note 13. See also, 27 MONT. L. REV. 211 (1966), for a comment on this decision.
Most prior Montana decisions have concerned themselves with appropriations which
utilized water by means of a diversion, which may explain the judicial language which
seems to indicate the need for a diversion. See especially: Sherlock v. Greaves, supra
note 11. But see: Federal Land Bank v. Morris, 112 Mont. 445, 116 P.2d 1007 (1941);
Montana Power Co. v. Broadwater Missouri Users Association, 50 F.Supp. 4 (D.Mont.
1942) ; rev'd on other grounds, 139 F.2d 998. (9th Cir. 1944).
uFor a historical background in Montana water law see: Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont.
154, 122 Pac. 575 (1912).
fish habitat is the natural stream bed and therefore it would do no good to
divert the water. However it is possible to store water by means of a dam in order
to provide for certain recreational facilities.
24
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15. The Montana Court recognized an appropriation for a
fish pond in Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P.2d 206 (1936). However the public right implied by the Court here would require a general recognition of
game fish use as a beneficial use.
5
2 The similarity is more conceptual than real. In the usual private appropriation there
are means of diverting the water out of the natural channel and then its subsequent
nThe
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there is a physical diversion, with a public use there is limited evidence
of the appropriation. The past use of a stream by fishermen may be
difficult to prove. 26 Further the court has indicated that the fact that
27
there are fish in the stream will not be sufficient to find a public right.
This will mean that for the individual stream a certain quantum of use
will have been necessary to establish a water right in the public. 2 . Thus
the standard of use which the courts establish will determine at what
29
time, on the individual stream, a right might have been acquired.
There may be some question as to whether such a right could be
acquired after 1921 on adjudicated streams. 30 The Montana Supreme
Court has held the statutory method of appropriation exclusive on such
streams. 31 However the statute was intended to deal exclusively with
private rights and is not appropriate for a public right. 32 On nonadjudicated streams there would be no problem, for the mere applica33
tion of the water to a beneficial use would be sufficient.
This decision wisely leaves open the most important question: what
type and quantum of use is necessary for the establishment of a public
water right? The answer to this question will not be simple, and it cannot be reached without having a marked effect on both public and private
users. The seemingly vested interests of private users are potentially
subject to a prior appropriation by the public.3 4 Although recreation is
a non-consumptive use there would still be a certain quantity of water
taken from other users in dry years. Further, if there were industrial
or agricultural pollution in sufficient quantity, the quality of the water
35
would have to be upgraded.

application to a beneficial purpose. In the case of a public right, there is no diversion
and in most streams there will be some public use, but it may or may not be
sufficient to acquire the right. However, in both instances if the application is of
sufficient public benefit to warrant the use of the water, then there will be the
acquisition of a water right.
26
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE FISH AND GAME CoMMisSION, supra note 15, and similar
reports will give some indication of the amount of public use certain streams receive.
'Instant case at 721.
nThe Court gave as one of the reasons for denying the right in this instance the lack
of sufficient use by the public. See note 10, supra.
'This point in time will determine the relative rights of public and private users. See:
Bullerdick v. Hermsrnyer, supra note 8.
'If the public right existed before 1921 it is not precluded by the fact that the stream
is now adjudicated. Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229, 250 Pac. 963 (1926).
"If sufficient public use of the stream was not until after 1921 there would be a
question as to whether a public right could have been acquired on an adjudicated
stream, since the statutory method has been held exclusive. Anaconda National Bank
v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 401, 411, 244 Pac. 141 (1926) ; Donich v. Johnson, supra note 30,
at 246.
IR.C.M. 1947, § 89-829 contemplates appropriation by means of diversion and hence
would not seem to apply to a non-diversionary public right.
'Vidal v. Kensler, 100 Mont. 592, 594-95, 51 P.2d 235 (1935); Clausen v. Armington,
123 Mont. 1, 14, 212 P.2d 440, 447-48 (1949).
34
Bullerdiclc v. Herinsmyer, supra note 8.
'The appropriator who has priority has a right which is measured by his maximum
need. Hence, under certain conditions, an appropriator may be entitled to all the
water in the stream. Sayre v. Johnson, 33 Mont. 15, 18-19, 81 Pac. 389 (1905).
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A balance may be achieved between these interests if the criteria
for the establishment of the public right are such that only valuable
recreational waters are appropriated. To accomplish this such intangibles
as reputation and access will be as important as the number of fish. 6
37
Game fishing is America's leading form of outdoor recreation.
Each year more than a quarter of a million fishermen, spending 36 million dollars, fish Montana waters.38 A majority of them prefer stream
fishing.3 9 Montana is one of the leading trout fishing states in the nation,40 yet this asset is one which can be quickly lost. In the Black Hills
41
of South Dakota 1,200 miles of trout streams have dwindled to 160.
The proper application of the instant decision could prevent such an
occurrence in Montana.

JAMES A. POORE III

CRIMINAL LAW:

CONSECUTIVE

SENTENCES

ALLOWED

FOR

BURGLARY

AND

TRANSACTION.-Petitioner and
companions, intent on stealing beer, broke a window in a beer parlor. They
LARCENY

COMMITTED IN

A SINGLE CRIMINAL

returned to a cafe, drank coffee, and then drove around to ascertain the
location of the city policeman so they would know it was safe to proceed.
Seeing him park his car, they returned to the saloon, climbed in the broken

window and removed 19 cases of beer from the premises. Held, petitioner
committed the separate and distinct offenses of burglary and larceny and
may be given consecutive sentences for each. Morigeau v. State, 423 P.2d 60
(Mont. 1967).
Whenever a defendant is charged with more than one offense arising out of a single criminal transaction, the question arises whether he

is being punished twice for a single crime. He may be charged with an
included offense-a crime that must necessarily be committed in the commission of another. For example, assault is included in assault and
battery,1 and there can be no crime of robbery 2 without the included
Since the appropriator is entitled to a certain quality of water also, this will create
conflicts due to the purity of water needed by fish.

See Atchinson v. Peterson, supra

note 19 and also note 16.
"6The primary consideration is the public use of the water rather than the preservation
of the fish per se. Thus the type of fish as well as the number is an important
consideration.
37
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE MONTANA FISH AND GAME COMMISSION, May 1, 1958April 30, 1960, at 23.
8lbid.
91d. at 32.
"'Id. at 23.
41COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 21.
OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 94-601 to 94-605, "Assaults."
CODES OF MONTANA are hereinafter cited R.C.M.)
2R.C.M. 1947, § 94-4301. (robbery defined).

'See REVISED CODES
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